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I. TJST OF AIT,PARTIES 
The Appellant is listed as shown on the heading. K & T, Inc., dba Budget 
Rent-A-Car will be referred to hereinafter as '"Budget." The Appellee is listed as 
shown on the heading. Todd L. Vowell will be referred to hereinafter as 
"Vowell." 
Manuel Deano Herrera, who is not a party to this present action, will be 
referred to hereinafter as "Herrera." DLSS Transportation, Inc. is also not a party 
to tliis present action, and will be referred to hereinafter as XT)LSS." 
1 
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of all Parties i 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities iv 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Issues Presented and Standard of Review 
Statutes, Ordinances and Rules of Central Importance to the Appeal.... 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
in Courts Below 
B. Statement of Facts 2 
Summary of the Argument 6 
Argument 7 
A. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed this Action on the 
Grounds of Res Judicata 7 
1. Issue Preclusion & Defensive Collateral Estoppel 9 
L Prior Adjudication 10 
ii. Prior Party Against whom Issue Preclusion 
is Asserted 11 
iii. First Action Completely Litigated 11 
iv. First Action - Final Judgment on Merits 11 
ii 
2. Claim Preclusion 11 
i. Same Parties, Privies, or Assigns 13 
ii. Claim Brought or Available in the First Action 13 
iii. Final Judgment on the Merits 14 
B. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed this Action Due to Budget's 
Failure to Join Necessary and Indispensable Parties 14 
1. Necessary Parties Pursuant to Rule 19(a) 16 
2. Indispensable Parties Pursuant to Rule 19(b) 18 
X. Conclusion 19 
i i i 
HI. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bonneville Tower v. Michie, 728 P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1986) 15,18 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005) 7, 8,12 
Bucknerv. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 847 (Utah 2004) 8, 9,10 
Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431,441 (1934) 16 
Coven <& Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf. Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984) 15 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1324,1236 (Utah 1980) 16 
Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127,1130 (Utah 1990) 15,16,17,18 
Manygoats v. Kkppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Ck. 1977) 18,19 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1359 (Utah Ct.App.1991) 3 
Schaerv. State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983) 9 
Seftelv. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941,945 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 18,19 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp. 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003) 10 
State v. Um>, 75 P.3d 923, 924 (Utah App. 2003) 2, 3 
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah 1988) 3 
State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1999) 3 
Timm v. Demnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1184 (Utah 1993) 10 
iv 
STATUTUES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 1 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure - Rule 11(h) 3 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure - Rule 24(a)(7) 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 12(b)(7) 1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 19 1,16,17,18 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
BLACK'S l ^ w DICTIONARY 107 (6th ed. 1998) 8 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Pleadings and Procedure, p. 689, (7th ed. 1994) 9 
v 
IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Budget's claims are barred 
under the doctrine of res judicata — issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 
(2) Whether the trial court erred in ruling under Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that Budget failed to join indispensable parties. 
Both issues were directly raised in VowelPs Motion to Dismiss. R. 25-26. 
A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss is a question of law which 
the appellate court reviews for correctness. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 846 
(Utah 2004). 
VI. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12 and 19. 
VIL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURTS BELOW 
In 2002 and 2003, Budget sought and obtained a judgment against DLSS 
for nonpayment under an agreement whereby DLSS rented cars from Budget 
during the winter Olympics. R. 40-48. Budget conducted discovery then had a 
trial on the merits, and had abundant opportunity to name Vowell as a party to 
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this prior proceeding, but did not do so. R. 49-64. Budget has now sued Vowell 
for the same obligation, asserting that the credit card which was found after a trial 
on the merits in the prior case to belong to DLSS (R. 42, % 7) now instead belongs 
to Vowell, and that Vowell is for some reason personally obligated to pay DLSS's 
debts. R. 1-3. The Trial court agreed with Vowell that Budget's effort is barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion, and 
that Budget also failed to name indispensable parties. R. 133-135. 
B, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As an initial matter, Vowell notes that none of the 8 paragraphs of "facts" 
submitted by Budget make any reference to the record as required by Rule 24(a)(7) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the first, seventh and eighth fact 
paragraphs may be acceptable because they reference exhibits attached by Budget 
to its brief, which exhibits are also found in the record (R. 1-18; R. 40-48), the 
other five "fact" paragraphs are completely unsupported by the record. Because 
Budget has failed to provide support for paragraphs 2 through 6 of its facts, the 
same should be disregarded. 
Vowell also notes that Budget included certain documents as "Addendum 
C" which are not found anywhere in the record. "An appellate court's "review is 
... limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.' [AJlthough the 
record may be supplemented if anything material is omitted, it may not be done by 
simply including the omitted material in the party's addendum.'" State v. Law, 75 
2 
P.3d 923, 924 (Utah App. 2003) citing State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 
1999). Rather, the proper procedure is by motion under Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and even then, "motions under rule 11(h) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are 'appropriate only when the record must be 
augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of 
reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record." Id. citing Olson v. 
Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1359 (Utah CtApp.l991)(emphasis added). 
That is exactly what Budget has attempted to do here. 
An appellate court may "weigh only those facts and legal arguments 
preserved for [it] in the trial court record." Olson, supra. Furthermore, "when 
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed 
to support the action of the trial court." State v. Unden, 761 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah 
1988). Accordingly, Budget's "Addendum C" must be disregarded, and any 
missing documentation in the record must be presumed to support the trial 
court's ruling against Budget 
VowelFs Statement of Facts are as follows: 
1. Budget filed suit against DLSS on August 23,2002, in the Third 
District Court. The case was identified as civil number 020908262, before Judge 
L.A.Dever. R. 40, 49-50. 
2. Vowell was not named as a defendant in this prior suit. The sole 
defendant was Herrera, which then later became DLSS. There is no indication 
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that Vowell was ever identified or even mentioned in any way in this prior suit 
during its entire three year history, even though there is a record of 11 certificates 
of service being filed in the case, apparendy in respect to discovery, and there were 
9 subpoenas issued prior to trial R. 40-64. 
3. In this prior DLSS lawsuit, after a bench trial on December 16, 2003 
(R. 40, 52-54), Judge Dever signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
February 10, 2004 (R. 40-48), which were prepared by Budget's counsel R. 54. 
The Findings of Fact by Judge Dever include the following: 
a. Between December 2001 and March 2002 (the time of the 
winter Olympics), DLSS rented various vehicles from Budget. R. 41, f^ 1. 
b. Herrera, as owner of DLSS, "represented that defendant 
[DLSS] would pay for vehicles it rented from plaintiff and that he would 
transfer money to American Express to cover the charges" (R. 41 f 3) and 
that "Herrera gave Clark an American Express credit card number to use" 
(R.41,14). 
c. Judge Dever found that "the American Express credit card 
number at issue in this case belongs to Defendant [DLSS]." R. 42, ^ f 7. 
4. Budget has acknowledged that $105,712.83 was charged back onto 
the American Express Card at issue on December 24, 2002, fully one year before 
the bench trial in the prior suit. R. 2-3, f 13; R. 8. 
5. In this first action, Judge Dever made conclusions of law as follows: 
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a. There were contracts between DLSS and Budget R. 45, ^ 1. 
b. DLSS owed Budget $131,425.32 under the contracts, plus 
interest and attorney fees and costs. No other party was identified as 
sharing this obligation with DLSS. R. 46, ffif 5-7. 
6. Budget brought suit against Vowell on January 20,2005. No other 
defendant was named in this new suit. R. 1. 
7. Notwithstanding Judge Dever's specific prior finding that the 
American Express credit card at issue belonged to DLSS (R. 42, f 7), Budget 
alleged in its Complaint against Vowell that the credit card actually belonged to 
him, and that between December 2001 and April 2002, 'T)LSS incurred rental 
charges ... which were charged to VowelFs American Express charge account," 
which Vowell supposedly authorized. R. 2, ff 9-11. 
8. Budget acknowledged in its Complaint against Vowell that it had 
brought suit against DLSS in August 2002, and that in early 2004, a year before its 
Complaint against Vowell, a judgment had been entered against DLSS. R. 5, fflf 
14-16. 
9. Budget asserted in its Complaint that Vowell had breached an 
agreement to pay car rental fees and owed Budget $132,289.50. R. 3, % 19. 
10. Vowell filed a Motion to Dismiss Budget's Complaint on April 26, 
2005 on the basis of res judicata and failure to join indispensable parties, namely 
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DLSS and Herrera (R. 25-26), who were mentioned 9 different times as involved 
parties in the few short paragraphs of Budget's Complaint against Vowell. R. 1-4. 
11. Budget in its response to VowelFs Motion to Dismiss did not deny 
VowelFs fact paragraph 10 of its Memo in Support of its motion that Budget "at 
no time suggests that Defendant Vowell has attempted to hide either his identity 
and/or his whereabouts." R. 29, f 10; R. 72-82. 
12. Indeed, Budget failed to controvert any of VowelFs fact paragraphs 
in the manner provided in Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed 
in its Memo in Opposition to even have a fact section at all. Specifically, Budget 
did not deny that Judge Dever after a tribal on the merits and consideration of all 
the evidence had found that the American Express credit card at issue belonged to 
DLSS and not Vowell or any other party. R. 72-82. 
13. VowelFs Motion to Dismiss was heard by the Honorable Robert P. 
Faust on July 11, 2007, following which the trial court issued a Memorandum 
Decision granting VowelFs Motion to Dismiss on the basis of res judicata and 
failure to join indispensable parties. R. 133-135. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Budget is attempting to have a second bite at the apple in this case by 
pursuing a new party on a debt that it failed to pursue previously when it had the 
chance. A clearer case of res judicata could hardly be found. After a trial on the 
merits and abundant opportunity for presentation of evidence, the court ruled, in 
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wording drafted by Budget's own counsel, that the American Express credit card 
that was to be used to pay for the car rentals from Budget (but was charged back a 
year before the trial) belonged to DLSS and not to Vowell or anyone else. Budget 
now seeks to relitigate this issue, asserting now that the credit card belongs to 
Vowell. In so doing, Budget tries to create a sense that Vowell is at fault in this 
matter. However, not only has Budget offered no support for this claim of fault, 
but in fact it is a red herring since Budget had its day in court in the prior case to 
show Vowell's fault but did not do so. 
In addition, Budget failed to name DLSS and Herrera as indispensable 
partiesin this matter, even though Budget admits that all of the negotiations were 
with Herrera on behalf of DLSS, and never once was there any contact between 
Budget and Vowell. Significandy, Herrera, by all accounts the key player in this 
matter, was originally named as the sole defendant in the original action, but was 
then, via stipulation, voluntarily replaced by DLSS as the sole defendant — instead 
of Herrera. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS ACTION ON 
T H E GROUNDS OF RES JUDICATA, 
Res Judicata refers to the overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be 
given to judgments. Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 
678, 686 (Utah 2005); (citations omitted). The doctrine of res judicata embraces 
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two distinct theories: issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 
P.3d 842, 847 (Utah 2004). 
Budget argues that res judicata is irrelevant in that "this case is not about a 
prior adjudication, but about responsibility for the debts of others." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5. However, the sole vehicle by which Budget seeks to make Vowell 
responsible for the debts of others is via an American Express card which was 
previously determined to belong to DLSS. R. 10. Hence, this case has everything 
to do with a prior adjudication. 
Budget's also argues against the trial court's decision to dismiss this action 
on the grounds of res judicata by attempting to distinguish the words "belong" 
and "own." This is because Judge Dever in the prior proceeding stated that the 
credit card belonged to DLSS, but Budget now claims that Vowell owns it. Brief 
of Appellant, p. 6. At first, Vowell was confused as to why Budget in its brief 
would use two different dictionaries to define two different everyday words -
using Webster's to define '"belong" and Black's to define "own." However, the 
reason for Budget's choice of dictionaries is likely apparent given that Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "belong" as "[t]o appertain to; to be the property of; to be a 
member of; to be appropriate; to own." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 107 (6th ed. 
1998),(emphasis added). This completely destroys Budget's theory that there is a 
difference between these terms. 
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1 ISSUE PRECLUSION & DEFENSIVE COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL. 
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit/5 Buckner, 99 P.3d at 846; citing Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 
1337,1340 (Utah 1983). "A judgment may have preclusive effects not only 
between the parties to the original proceeding, but also between such a party and 
one who was not a party to the first action/' See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Pleadings 
and Procedure, p. 689, (7th ed. 1994). 
For the most part, Budget's Brief of Appellant completely ignores the 
matter of issue preclusion and/or defensive collateral estoppel. Budget's only 
argument is that the issues are not identical to the DLSS matter - in that the DLSS 
matter determined that the American Express card '"belongs" (R. 10) to DLSS, 
and now, several years after the DLSS trial, Budget seeks to determine that Vowell 
"owns" the very card which '"belongs" to DLSS. Other than some minor 
semantics, the record clearly demonstrates that the matters are identical to the 
DLSS case — even to the point where Budget repeatedly referenced the DLSS 
matter and attached the DLSS Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as an 
exhibit R. 145. 
The test for whether or not a matter should be barred on the basis of issue 
preclusion/collateral estoppel is as follows: 
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(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; (2) the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the 
prior adjudication; (3) the issue in the first action was completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Buckner, 99 P.3d at 847; citing Snyder v. Murray City Corp. 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003); 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1184 (Utah 1993). In the case at hand, the four-
prong test for issue preclusion/collateral estoppel is met as follows: 
i. Prior Adjudication 
The first requirement for issue preclusion/collateral estoppel is whether 
"the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the instant action/' In 
this present action, the new issue Budget has attempted to create is whether or not 
payment was authorized by Vowell to an American Express Credit Card belonging 
to him. R. 2, 3. However, there was already a "prior adjudication" that the 
American Express credit card belonged to DLSS and that it authorized the 
transactions. R. 10. It was the Honorable L.A. Dever's findings that the 
"American Express credit card number at issue in this case belongs to defendant 
[DLSS], plaintiff obtained the credit card number from defendant [DLSS]." R. 11. 
This finding of fact was not a mistake or an oversight, given that this particular 
finding was drafted by Budget - with hand-written editing by Judge Dever. R. 10. 
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ii. Prior Party Against whom Issue Preclusion 
is Asserted 
The second requirement for issue preclusion/collateral estoppel is whether 
the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party to the prior 
adjudication. In the case at hand, Vowell is asserting the issue preclusion against 
Budget — which was a "party to the prior adjudication." 
iii. First Action Completely Litigated. 
The third requirement for issue preclusion/collateral estoppel is whether 
the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated. In the first 
action, there was a full day bench trial on December 16, 2003, in which multiple 
witnesses were called and exhibits were offered. R. 52-54. As a result of trial in 
the first action, Budget received a judgment against DLSS. R. 8-15. There is 
nothing to suggest, in either the first action or this present action, that the first 
action was not "fairly litigated/' 
iv. First Action - Final Judgment on Merits 
The fourth and final requirement for issue preclusion/collateral estoppel is 
the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. This requirement is met in 
that there were Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (drafted by Budget) 
issued as a result of trial in the first DLSS action. R. 8-15. 
2. CLAIM PRECLUSION. 
In dismissing Budget's cause of action against Vowell, the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision stated as follows: 
11 
[Tjo the extent that [Budget] now seeks to assert claims based on 
theories of alter ego, principal/agent or silent partner, [Budget] 
should have joined [Vowell] in the first action and pursued such 
claims there. Having failed to do so, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion bars [Budget] from bringing such claims in this action. 
R. 134. 
Budget's only argument against claim preclusion is that the matters are 
"entirely different" in that the present matter is about making Vowell personally 
liable for DLSS's debts arising from the first matter. See Brief of Appellant, p. 8. 
In other words, Vowell should not concern himself with and/or question how or 
why judgment was entered against DLSS. Vowell should not be concerned with 
the fact that he was not a party to the prior action, did not get to question 
witnesses, did not get to conduct discovery, did not get to review evidence, etc. 
Vowell should simply pay DLSS's debt — the fewer questions asked about the 
prior DLSS matter the better. 
Claim preclusion '"bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a 
claim that has been fully litigated previously." Brigham Young University, 110 P.3d at 
686. For claim preclusion to apply, three requirements must be met: 
(1) The subsequent action must involve the same parties, their 
privies, or their assigns to the first action, (2) the claim to be barred 
must have been brought or have been available in the first action, 
and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the 
merits of the claim. 
Id In the case at hand, the three-prong test for claim preclusion was met as 
follows: 
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i. Same Parties, Privies, or Assigns 
The first requirement for claim preclusion is that this present action involve 
the "same parties, their privies, or their assigns to the first action/' To overcome 
this requirement, Budget must show that Vowell and DLSS were lacking in privity. 
However, Budget's Complaint asserted that Vowell is in privity with DLSS. R. 4, 
% 21. Although Budget did not specify the link in its Complaint, Budget clearly 
attempted to tie Vowell into the original action via some unspecified alter ego, 
principal/agent, and/or silent partner theory where Budget asserted that '^Vowell 
is bound for payment to [Budget]." R. 3, f 18. 
In short, Budget's concession of privity prevents its attack on claim 
preclusion, and highlights the reason why res judicata should prevent Budget from 
reMgating this matter. Although Vowell has always denied privity between 
himself and DLSS, Budget has claimed otherwise. Budget cannot have it both 
ways. Either Vowell is in privity with DLSS, in which case claim preclusion bars 
Budget's action, or Vowell has no privity with DLSS, in which case Budget's own 
pleadings show that it has no case against Vowell. 
ii. Claim Brought or Available in the First Action 
The second requirement for claim preclusion is that the claim to be barred 
must have been brought or have been available in the first action. In this present 
action, the trial court properly barred Budget's claims under the doctrine of claim 
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preclusion because the issue of the ownership and liability for the American 
Express Card was already brought and fully adjudicated in the first action. R. 10. 
Even if this were true, certainly Budget's present claims against Vowell 
were "available in the first action/' Any claim by Budget against Vowell both 
could have and should have been brought in the first action. There is no 
evidence, or even claim asserted for that matter, to suggest that Vowell was not 
available to be joined as a defendant to the first action. Instead Budget was 
content for more than 2 years to pursue Herrera and then DLSS in the first action 
before initiating an action against Vowell — searching for someone to pay off its 
judgment against DLSS. 
iii. Final Judgment on the Merits 
The third and final requirement for claim preclusion is that the first action 
must have produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim. As already 
stated, there were Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued both as to 
liability and the ownership of the American Express credit card as a result of a trial 
and final judgment on the merits in the action against DLSS. R. 8-15. 
B. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS ACTION D U E 
TO BUDGET'S FAILURE TO JOIN NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, 
The trial court properly determined, in dismissing this action against 
Vowell, that Budget failed to join necessary and indispensable parties - namely 
DLSS and Herrera. DLSS and Herrera are referenced multiple times in the 
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Complaint against Vowell. In fact, in the "General Factual Allegations" of 
Budget's Complaint against Vowell, DLSS and Herrera are referred to more times 
than Vowell himself. When Vowell is mentioned, it is only with respect to a credit 
card that had his name on it, and never in conjunction with any action by Vowell. 
R. 1-4. At no point in time did Budget ever have any contact or interaction with 
Vowell until Budget filed suit against Vowell — more than two years after Budget's 
trial against DLSS. R. 1, 52. 
An indispensable or necessary party is "one whose presence is required for 
a full and fair determination of his rights as well as of the rights of the other 
parties to the suit." Cowen <& Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 
1984). "The failure to join parties indispensable to a proper resolution of the 
controversy is grounds for dismissal of the action." Bonneville Tower v. Michie, 728 
P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1986). "The basic purpose of rule 19 is to protect the 
interest of absent persons as well as those already before the court from multiple 
litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations." handes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127,1130 (Utah 1990), (citations omitted). 
Budget argues that "[c]omplete relief can be accorded with only Vowell in 
the present action, as the issue is simply to hold Vowell liable for that previously 
determined debt." Brief of Appellant, p. 9. Vowell does not dispute that 
"complete relief can be accorded to Budget. However, Vowell is more 
concerned that "complete relief cannot be accorded to Vowell - in that DLSS's 
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debt was "previously determined" in his absence. Justice Brandeis stated that 
"[ujnless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may 
rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights." 
Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934). In other words, if 
Budget is to proceed against Vowell, he should have the right to defend all matters 
- including the original issue of liability as between Budget and DLSS - even if the 
end result is "inconsistent obligations" which Rule 19 seeks to avoid. To do so, 
Vowell will need both Herrera and DLSS as co-defendants in order to best defend 
himself. 
In 'applying Rule 19, the trial court properly determined that DLSS and 
Herrera are necessary parties under Rule 19(a) and indispensable parties under 
Rule 19(b). 
1. NECESSARY PARTIES PURSUANT TO RULE 19(A) 
"Rule 19(a), U.R.C.P. requires the joinder of "persons having a joint 
interest." Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1324,1236 (Utah 1980). 
To determine whether a party is necessary, a court should consider 
the two general factors in rule 19(a). First, a party is necessary if "in 
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). Second, a party is necessary if he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest 
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial 
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
LW*r,795P.2datl l30. 
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In the present matter, it is not possible for Vowell to be afforded complete 
relief, let alone attempt to tender an adequate defense, without the presence DLSS 
and Herrera. Most importandy, failing to join these two defendants leaves Vowell 
at "a substantial risk of incurring.. .otherwise inconsistent obligations." Id. 
For reasons unknown to Vowell, Budget only pursued DLSS to a final trial 
in the first action. Budget originally filed suit against Herrera on August 22,2002. 
R. 49. However, on April 7, 2003, an Order was signed — which apparendy 
substituted DLSS in for Herrera. R. 50. Ultimately, the matter proceeded to trial 
with Judgment being entered against DLSS — the sole defendant to Budget's 
original action. R. 40-48. Herrera didnot have a judgment entered against him, 
even though he is clearly the key player and is referred to time and time again in 
both the first action and Budget's Complaint against Vowell. If Vowell is now 
forced to defend this action, widiout joining these key players, Vowell will be 
prejudiced. Budget is seeking to make Vowell personally liable even though it 
apparendy could not hold Herrera liable in the first action, who was obviously a 
major player to the overall issue. Clearly this puts Vowell at "a substantial risk of 
incurring.. .otherwise inconsistent obligations/' Id. 
DLSS and Herrera are necessary parties to this action in that they are the 
parties that "rented various" vehicles from Budget, "dealt direcdy with . . . 
concerning vehicles . . . rented," had "discussions" and represented they would 
"pay for the vehicles" and "indicated drivers were authorized to sign rental 
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contracts on [their] behalf." R. 41, 42. Although DLSS and Herrera's names are 
peppered throughout Budget's Complaint against Vowell, Vowell's name is 
nowhere to be found in the Findings of Fact in the original action against Herrera 
and then DLSS. Thus, while Vowell may not have been an indispensable party to 
Budget's claims against DLSS and Hererra, DLSS and Herrera are indispensable to 
Budget's claims against Vowell. 
Finally, if DLSS and Herrera are necessary parties according to the above 
criteria, Rule 19 provides that they must be joined to this action. Under the 
language of the rule, "if the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then joinder 
is mandatory." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1131. 
2. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES PURSUANT TO RULE 19(B) 
Once a party is found to be necessary under Rule 19(a), then the attention 
is turned "to analyze indispensability under rule 19(b)." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1132. 
"Rule 19(b) analysis involves questions of equity and therefore is committed to the 
discretion of the court The analysis is basically a balancing of the inequities that 
would result from proceeding without the nonjoined party, specifically including 
the four factors of rule 19(b)." Id, citing Bonneville, 728 P.2d at 1020. Thus the 
trial court must exercise "the discretion to proceed without the party or to dismiss 
the action for failure to join an indispensable party." Id. The "ultimate test under 
Rule 19(b) is "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed."' 
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Sefielv. Capital City Bank, 161 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct App. 1989); citing Manygoats 
v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Or. 1977). 
Budget argues that "Herrera's rights will not be affected since he filed 
bankruptcy, discharging any obligation/' Brief of Appellant, p. 11. Although it is 
VowelTs understanding that Herrera received a discharge in Bankruptcy Case No. 
05-37361 on April 18, 2006 - more than three years after Budget voluntarily 
substituted Herrera out of the matter for DLSS — the present matter is not 
whether Vowell is necessary to protect Hererra's rights, but whether Herrera is 
necessary to protect VowelTs rights. 
The trial Court properly exercised its discretion — determining that this 
action should not proceed without DLSS and Herrera. Budget's procedural 
problems in this present matter are a self-inflicted problem created by Budget, and 
Budget alone. Budget could have named Vowell as a defendant to the original 
action — had Budget believed the same to be appropriate — just as it did with 
Herrera, and then later DLSS. 
In sum, the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, correctly notes that 
Budget should have joined Vowell to the first action (R. 134) which would have 
avoided Budget's present problem with indispensable and necessary parties. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled that res judicata bars Budget's attempt to re-
litigate this matter - due to both issue preclusion/collateral estoppel and the 
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doctrine of claim preclusion. The trial court also properly concluded that Budget 
failed to join indispensable parties. The ruling of the trial court should accordingly 
be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November 2007. 
SNOW JENSEN & REECE 
Curtis M Jensen 
N. Adam Caldwell 
Attorneys for Todd Vowell 
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